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ABSTRACT
The 2001 No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) increased accountability pressure in U.S.
public schools by threatening to impose sanctions on Title 1 schools that failed to make adequate
yearly progress (AYP) in consecutive years. Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of
failing AYP in the first year of NCLB on teacher effort in the subsequent year suggest that, on
average, teacher absences in North Carolina fell by about 10 percent, and the probability of being
absent 15 or more times fell by about 30 percent. Reductions in teacher absences were driven by
within-teacher increases in effort and were larger among more effective teachers.
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The public-sector accountability movement originated in the U.S. in the 1980s under the
premise that performance can—and should—be measured in the public and non-profit sectors
(Figlio & Kenny, 2009). Recent reforms in numerous areas of the public sector, including public
education, have focused on using objective, observable measures of performance to reward
efficiency and responsiveness and to hold units accountable (Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith
2011). In the context of K-12 public education, high-stakes (i.e., evidence- or test-based)
accountability policies aim to evaluate teachers, schools, or students on the basis of students’
performance on standardized exams (Ladd 1996). Such policies now play a prominent role in
both state and federal U.S. education policy (Figlio and Loeb 2011). The rationale for such
policies is that attaching incentives to students’ performance on standardized exams will alleviate
the principal-agent problem inherent in the relationship between stakeholders and schools and
improve student outcomes as a result (Figlio and Loeb 2011). More generally, education
economists argue that properly-aligned incentives can increase student achievement and decrease
the costs of public education (e.g., Hanushek 1994; Hoxby 2007).
The proliferation of state-level accountability policies in the 1990s and the 2001 passage
of the Federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) reflect education policymakers’ enthusiasm for
such policies and have provided researchers with numerous contexts in which to investigate the
impact of such policies on student achievement. Figlio and Loeb (2011), Figlio and Ladd (2008)
and Hout and Elliot (2011) provide thorough reviews of this literature, which generally finds
modest but statistically significant effects of about 0.1 to 0.3 test-score standard deviations (SD).
For example, Carnoy and Loeb (2002) and Hanushek and Raymond (2005) exploit cross-state
variation in the strength of high-stakes accountability policies and find positive effects on student
test scores. Similarly, Dee and Jacob (2011) compare the effect of NCLB on student achievement
1

in states that had preexisting high-stakes accountability systems similar to NCLB to NCLB’s
effect in states that did not, arguing that states without preexisting high-stakes accountability
policies were “treated more intensely” by NCLB, and find that NCLB improved math test scores
in “treated” states by about 0.2 SD.
However, critics of high-stakes accountability policies worry that these test-score gains
are illusory and reflect strategic responses by schools rather than true learning gains. For
example, high-stakes accountability policies’ relatively narrow focus on standardized test scores,
usually in math and reading, may cause teachers and schools to divert resources and instructional
time away from non-tested topics and skills that are valued by stakeholders and important for
students’ long-run socioeconomic success (Baker et al. 2010). Indeed, some evidence suggests
that teachers “teach to the test,” as Jacob (2005) uses an interrupted time series research design
to find an effect of a high-stakes accountability policy in Chicago Public Schools of about 0.3
SD on high-stakes tests but no effect on low-stakes National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP) test scores. Similarly, Reback, Rockoff, and Schwartz (2014) find evidence that NCLB
accountability pressure caused schools to shift time away from nontested subjects like science
and social studies. There is also evidence of more nefarious unintended consequences of highstakes accountability policies. For example, schools have prevented low-performing students
from taking the standardized tests on which accountability policies are based either by
reclassifying certain students as non-tested special-education students (Cullen and Reback, 2006)
or suspending them on test days (Figlio 2006). There is even evidence of outright teacher
cheating (Jacob and Levitt 2003).
As a result, the mechanisms through which high-stakes accountability policies affect
students’ academic achievement are not entirely understood, but have implications for the design
2

of future education policies. Increased teacher effort is one potential mechanism through which
high-stakes accountability policies might improve student achievement, as teachers are among
the most important school-provided educational inputs (Ahn 2013; Hanushek and Rivkin 2010;
Jacob 2013). Teacher attendance is one measure of teacher effort, or teacher productivity, that
affects student achievement (Ahn 2013; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2009; Das, Habyarimana,
and Krishman 2007; Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan 2012; Herrmann and Rockoff 2012; Miller,
Murnane, and Willet, 2008). Moreover, teacher attendance is positively correlated with both
principals’ ratings of teachers and teachers’ value-added scores (Jacob and Walsh 2011). Teacher
absences are also costly in other ways: the substitute teachers necessitated by teacher absences
are financially costly (Roza 2007) and teacher absences create negative externalities, as Bradley,
Green, and Leeves (2007) find that teachers’ absences are affected by the attendance of their
peers. The current study contributes to our understanding of the mechanisms through which
consequential accountability policies affect student achievement and, more generally, how
public-sector employees respond to the threat of sanctions associated with performance standards
by examining how, if at all, failing to make adequate yearly progress (AYP) in the first year of
NCLB affected teacher absence rates.
The direction of the effect of high-stakes accountability policies on teacher absences is
theoretically ambiguous, as such policies might affect teachers in two ways. 1 On the one hand,
the incentives provided by such policies are intended to increase teacher effort (Ahn 2013;
Hansen 2009). Viewing attendance as a type of employee effort, high-stakes accountability

1

The direction of the effect of accountability policies on teacher turnover is similarly theoretically
ambiguous (e.g., Clotfelter et al. 2004; Feng, Figlio, and Sass 2010).
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policies are hypothesized to decrease teacher absences. 2 Indeed, Jacob (2013) uses a differencein-difference (DD) research design to show that a policy change in Chicago Public Schools that
increased principals’ ability to dismiss probationary teachers resulted in a significant decrease in
probationary teachers’ absences. On the other hand, the stress and pressure placed on teachers by
high-stakes accountability policies might increase the psychic costs associated with teaching and
lead to higher rates of teacher absences as a result (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2009; Johansson
and Palme 1996; Ose 2005). Which of these two hypothesized effects dominates is an empirical
question that I address in the current study using statewide administrative longitudinal data on
public primary school teachers in North Carolina. Specifically, I employ a DD-style
identification strategy using data from the first two years of NCLB. The treatment is failing to
make AYP in the first year of NCLB, which “turned on” the threat of sanctions for failing to
make AYP in two consecutive years. The main results suggest that the threat of sanctions
following failure to make AYP in the initial year of NCLB caused a robust, statistically
significant decrease in teacher absences that cannot be explained by preexisting differential
trends in treated schools nor by changes in the composition of treated schools’ teaching staffs.
These effects are larger among more effective teachers and are arguably practically significant,
representing 10 percent declines in teacher absences.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the relevant institutional
details regarding teacher absences and accountability policy in North Carolina. The following
section introduces a theoretical model of teacher absences from which the econometric model is
derived. The paper then describes the data and presents the results. The final section concludes.

2

See Ahn (2013), Hansen (2009), and Jacob (2013) for further justification of the use of teacher absences
as a proxy for teacher effort and productivity.
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BACKGROUND
Teacher Absences in North Carolina
Teachers in North Carolina’s public schools are permitted to take a limited number of
absences per year, though not without incurring some personal costs. The current study focuses
on two particular types of absences—sick and personal leave—as these are the most relevant
sources of teacher absences during the school year (Ahn 2013; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor
2009). Teachers accrue sick leave at a rate of one day per month. For this reason, the cost of sick
days is decreasing in teacher experience. Unused sick days can be redeemed at retirement for
additional pension benefits, which makes using accumulated sick days costly to teachers.
Teachers can also use more than their allotted number of sick days at a cost of $50 per absence
and are similarly charged $50 per day of personal leave. Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2009)
show that between 1995 and 2004 the average public-school classroom teacher in North Carolina
took about seven sick days and one personal leave day per academic year. As expected, absences
are slightly more common among more experienced teachers. The authors also examine the
predictors of teacher absences, finding that absences are more common among teachers in
elementary schools and schools serving low-income students. Teacher absences are less common
among teachers who have a masters degree, graduated from a selective undergraduate institution,
or are National Board Certified (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2009).
Preexisting ABC Accountability Policy
North Carolina first implemented the ABC accountability policy at the start of the 1996–
1997 academic year. Henceforth, academic years are referred to by the year of the spring
semester. The ABC policy is notable in that it focuses on achievement growth in addition to
5

achievement levels, as schools are thought to have relatively more influence on the former.
Achievement is measured by student performance on end-of-grade tests in math and reading
administered each spring in grades 3–8. The tests are state mandated, aligned with state
standards, criterion referenced, and vertically aligned. Schools that fail to make expected growth
are labeled as either “no recognition” or “low performing,” depending on whether or not at least
50 percent of students score at or above grade level. Schools that make expected growth are
labeled as such, and schools that exceed expected growth by 10 percent or more are classified as
“high growth.” However, there are no direct sanctions for failing to meet growth requirements.
Ahn (2013) carefully describes how these classifications are made.
Teachers in “high” and “expected” growth schools receive annual bonuses of $1,500 and
$750, respectively. Ahn (2013) exploits the resulting discontinuity in award receipt to examine
how teachers’ effort responds to incentives. Intuitively, Ahn finds a U-shaped relationship
between teacher effort and the probability of receiving a bonus, with highest effort occurring
when bonus receipt is uncertain. Similarly, Clotfelter et al. (2004) point out that while ABC’s
focus on growth provides an arguably more valid measure of school performance, it is not
perfect, as there may be numerous barriers to growth in low-performing schools. For this reason,
teachers may attempt to transfer out of schools with low baseline achievement levels. The
authors estimate the effect of ABC on teacher turnover using a DD strategy that compares
turnover in low- and high-performing schools, before and after the implementation of ABC, and
find that ABC increased turnover probabilities by about 25 percent in low-performing schools.
However, given the current study’s focus on the introduction of NCLB, it is worth stressing that
the determinants of AYP and expected growth are mostly unrelated and nearly half of schools
that make expected growth fail AYP, and vice versa (Ahn 2013).
6

The 2001 No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB)
NCLB extended North Carolina’s existing ABC accountability policy in three ways.
First, it required that all schools make AYP, which differed from existing ABC growth
requirements by requiring that schools meet percent proficient, attendance, and test-participation
thresholds both overall and for specific subgroups of the student population. Second, NCLB
mandated that states publish “school report cards” containing information on schools’
performance levels and AYP status. Third, NCLB mandated additional sanctions on Title 1
schools that failed to make AYP in consecutive years. The current study focuses on Title 1
schools, as such schools comprise the majority of North Carolina’s public primary schools, and
the threat of sanctions is particularly salient. The identification strategy described below exploits
the fact that Title 1 schools that failed to make AYP in 2003, the first year of NCLB, were under
considerably more pressure in 2004 than Title 1 schools that made AYP in 2003. This idea is
similar to that used by Chakrabarti (2014), who also considers 2003 a “pre-program” year, and
Ahn and Vigdor (2014), who exploit variation in schools’ AYP histories. The current study
focuses on the first two years of NCLB for two reasons. First, data on teacher absences are
unreliable after 2004 (Ahn 2013). Second, the determination of AYP became more complex after
2004 due to NCLB waivers and “Safe Harbor” exemptions (e.g., Polikoff and Wrabel 2013).
Title 1 was a component of the original ESEA that was reinstituted by NCLB, which
provides federal funds to schools in proportion to the number of low-income students attending
the school (Gordon 2008). This money can be used to cover the cost of tutoring, after-school
care, and summer programs, which reinforce the school’s standard curriculum. When NCLB was
first implemented, it mandated that Title 1 schools that failed to make AYP for two consecutive
years enter Program Improvement—a five-year process of steadily increasing consequences that
7

culminates with the drastic restructuring of the school (e.g., the school is reinvented as a charter,
taken over by the state, or replaces a majority of the staff). Therefore, the passage of NCLB
placed pressure on all Title 1 schools, and this pressure increased in severity in Title 1 schools
that failed AYP in the first year of NCLB. Accordingly, DD estimates of the effect of failing
AYP on teacher absences likely underestimate the total effect of NCLB on teacher absences, as
the policy placed pressure on all schools in 2004, even those that did not fail AYP in 2003
(Fuller and Ladd 2013).

MODELLING TEACHER ABSENCES
Theoretical Model and Comparative Statics
Some teachers surely relish the opportunity to improve student performance and increase
effort in response to accountability pressure, if for no other reason than to avoid the negative
consequences of failing to make AYP (Figlio and Loeb 2011). Not all teachers necessarily
respond in this way, however, as high-stakes testing decreases teachers’ classroom autonomy and
sense of job security (Luna and Turner 2001; Reback, Rockoff, and Schwartz 2014) and might
increase teachers’ stress levels (Barksdale-Ladd and Thomas 2000; Daly and Chrispeels 2005;
Fuller and Ladd 2013). Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that the exogenous increase in
accountability pressure created by an unexpected policy change in Florida increased teacher
turnover (Feng, Figlio, and Sass 2010). On average, then, the net effect of high-stakes
accountability policies on teacher effort, as measured by teacher absences, is theoretically
ambiguous. Whether the increase in disutility associated with teaching, particularly among
teachers in tested (high-stakes) grades and threatened (non-AYP) schools, outweighs the
incentives to increase effort is an empirical question.
8

It is useful to formalize the intuitive argument made above by viewing employees’ daily
attendance (i.e., absence) decisions as daily labor supply decisions. Assuming that teachers
maximize expected utility when making such decisions, teachers’ optimal behavior is governed
by a simple “reservation wage” decision rule (Bradley, Greene, and Leeves 2007; Gershenson
2012). Formally, teacher i chooses to work on day d if the expected utility of working (U idW )
exceeds the expected utility of being absent (U idA ) and is absent otherwise. Assuming that these
daily utilities contain additively-separable stochastic terms, the probability that teacher i is absent
on day d is
G (U idA − U idW ) ,
Pr ( aid ==
1) Pr (U idA ≥ U idW ) =

(1)

where G is the CDF of the distribution of the difference between the two stochastic components
of daily utility, as in the standard random utility model (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p. 477).
In expectation, then, teacher i’s total annual absences (A) are simply
=
E ( Ai )

(2)

∑ G (U
d

A
id

− U idW ).

Assuming that UW is decreasing in hours worked (H), the disutility associated with teaching (Ψ)
is increasing in accountability pressure (p), and that UA is decreasing in p due to the relationship
between teacher absences and student achievement, straightforward application of the chain rule
shows that the direction of the effect of p on teacher absences is ambiguous. 3 Formally,

δ E ( A)
=
δp

(3)

 δ U A δ U W δψ 
′
G
⋅
∑ d ( )  δ p − δψ ⋅ δ p ,



3

See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Stern (1986) for descriptions of utility functions that incorporate
the disutility of working and their corresponding labor supply functions. Two common examples are the Frisch and
Stone-Geary functional forms.
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where G′ is strictly positive, and the second term on the RHS of (3) is positive if and only if

δ U A δ U W δψ
>
. Intuitively, the net effect depends on the relative sizes of the “incentive” and
δp
δψ δ p
“disutility” effects. Note that the sign of Equation (3) is ambiguous even under the strong
assumption that teachers’ preferences are constant across days; daily fluctuations in preferences
provide an additional potential source of ambiguity. The empirical strategy for identifying the
sign of Equation (3) (i.e., how teacher absences respond to accountability pressure) is presented
in the following section.
Econometric Model and Identification Strategy
The baseline analytic sample is restricted to the 2003 and 2004 academic years, as 2003
was the first year of NCLB and thus the first year that AYP was computed. Given the threatened
sanctions associated with failing AYP in two consecutive years, 2004 was the first year that a
school could possibly enroll in Program Improvement. Accordingly, the preferred model of
teacher i’s absences (A, in levels), while in school s and year t, is a DD specification similar to
the baseline specification in Jacob (2013). Formally,
(4)

A=
γ d 04t + τ d 04t × Failed 03s + β X ist + θ s + ε ist ,
ist

where d04 is a binary indicator equal to one in 2004 and zero in 2003; Failed03 is a binary
indicator equal to one if school s failed to make AYP in 2003 and zero otherwise; X is a vector of
observed teacher and school characteristics, including the teacher’s National Board Certification,
experience, educational attainment, selectivity of undergraduate institution, race, and gender and
the school’s total enrollment, full-time equivalent teachers, student-teacher ratio, percent of
enrollment eligible for free or reduced price lunch, and percent of enrollment that is non-white; θ
is a school fixed effect (FE), and ε is an idiosyncratic error term. The elements of X and the
10

school FE are consistent with the broad categories of theoretical determinants of employee
absences identified by Ichino and Maggi (2000) and Bradley, Green and Leeves (2007). 4
Conditioning on X and θ tend to improve the precision of estimates of τ, the effect of the increase
in accountability pressure caused by the failure to make AYP in the inaugural year of NCLB,
which is the primary parameter of interest. However, the main results are robust to omitting X
and θ from Equation (4) and to adding school-specific time trends.
Importantly, the school FEs subsume the time-invariant Failed03 indicator and imply that
comparisons are made within, as opposed to between, schools. Still, the possibility of preexisting
school-specific trends is a threat to identification, as schools that failed to make AYP in 2003
may have been on systematically different growth paths than those that did make AYP. I test the
importance of this concern using an augmented event-study version of Equation (4) using data
dating back to 1997 that include a full set of year×Failed03 interactions. Similarly, Equation (4)
can be augmented to include either teacher FE or teachers’ lagged absences to control for the
nonrandom sorting of teachers to schools. Finally, I test for heterogeneous effects by teacher
characteristics by augmenting Equation (4) to include a full set of interaction terms. The baseline
models are estimated by OLS, and standard errors are clustered at the school level. 5 A number of
additional sensitivity analyses are conducted and discussed in the Results section.

4

Specifically, the categories are individual background, school background (i.e., locality or contextual
effects), and group (social) interaction effects whereby group norms affect individual absence rates. Ose (2005) also
provides theoretical and empirical support for the hypothesis that workplace environments might affect employee
absences.
5
Teacher absences are not actually a count variable because the data contain fractions of absences, so
negative binomial and poisson regressions are not appropriate.
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Data
The primary analyses are of primary (K–5) public school teachers who taught in Title 1
schools in North Carolina in 2003 and 2004, though the event-study analysis utilizes data going
back to 1997. These longitudinal teacher-level administrative data are maintained and provided
by the North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC). 6 The NCERDC data contain
administrative records on teachers’ absences per pay period, race, gender, experience, National
Board Certification, educational attainment, and undergraduate institution attended. The baseline
analytic sample is restricted to teacher-years in which these variables, and school-level
information on total enrollment, student demographics, and full-time equivalent teachers are
observed in the first two years of NCLB. There are 8,080 such teacher-years.
Following previous research on teacher absences in North Carolina (Ahn 2013;
Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2009), total annual teacher absences are calculated as the sum of
absences coded as either sick or personal leave. The third broad class of absence, vacation leave,
typically occurs during days that school is not in session and is thus excluded from the
operationalized definition of teacher absences. Column (1) of Table 1 reports summary statistics
for the baseline analytic sample. The average teacher was absent almost nine times per year,
which is consistent with previous research and largely driven by sick leave. The standard
deviation of nearly 10 indicates significant variation in teacher absences.
To better understand the variation in teachers’ absences I decompose the total variation
into within-school, -school-year, and -teacher variation by estimating “within-unit” SD. I do so
by computing the SD of the residuals from regressions of teacher absences on sets of school,
school-by-year, and teacher FE, respectively. The within-school and within-school-year SD
6

See http://www.childandfamilypolicy.duke.edu/project_detail.php?id=35 (accessed January 8, 2014).
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reported in column (1) for the baseline analytic sample are quite close to the overall SD,
indicating that nearly 97 percent of the total variation in teacher absences occurs within, as
opposed to between, schools. Moreover, about 95 percent of the total variation occurs within
school years. Importantly, these results suggest that there is sufficient within-school and withinschool-year variation to identify the preferred school-FE specifications. The within-teacher SD is
about half as large as the overall SD, indicating that the total variation in teacher absences is
approximately evenly split between and within teachers. This suggests that teacher absences are
somewhat “sticky,” but again, there is enough within-teacher variation to implement teacher FE
estimators.
The analytic sample is approximately evenly split across the 2003 and 2004 school years,
which were the first two years of NCLB, and across tested grades (3–5) and nontested grades
(kindergarten and 2–3). About one-quarter of teachers had earned a master’s degree, and a trivial
percentage had earned a doctorate. Teachers who reported less than a four-year degree are
excluded from the sample. Five percent of teachers attended a selective undergraduate
institution, where selectivity is coded as a dichotomous variable based on ratings from Barron’s
Profiles of American Colleges. Specifically, the selective indicator equals one if Barron’s rated
the institution as “most” or “highly” selective, and zero otherwise. Ten percent of teachers were
National Board Certified, and the average teacher had 14 years of experience teaching in North
Carolina. The analytic sample is predominantly female and white.
I also test for heterogeneity by teacher effectiveness using value-added measures
(VAMs). The VAMs are generated by using NCERDC student-teacher matched student-level
administrative data on end-of-grade math test scores to estimate standard lag-score value-added
models. Accordingly, VAMs are available for teachers who taught at least two years in fourth or
13

fifth grade. 7 Math scores are used because the literature on teacher effectiveness typically finds
greater variation in teachers’ effects on math than on reading (e.g., Gershenson forthcoming;
Hanushek and Rivkin 2010). Importantly, I estimate VAMs for all teachers who taught in 2003
and 2004, not only those for whom absence data are available, and then record the quartile of the
full distribution of teacher effectiveness in which teachers in the baseline analytic sample are
located.
Column (2) of Table 1 reports summary statistics for the subsample of the baseline
analytic sample for whom VAM scores are available. The VAM subsample summarized in
column (2) closely resembles the baseline sample summarized in column (1), with two notable
exceptions: the VAM subsample contains more tested-grade and male teachers. Intuitively, the
former is due to VAM scores being unavailable for teachers in nontested grades. Tested-grade
teachers do not comprise the entire VAM subsample, however, because some teachers
transitioned to a tested grade after being in a nontested grade in 2004. Brummet, Gershenson,
and Hayes (2013) and Ost (2014) show that grade switching is fairly common among primary
school teachers. The latter is due to men being more likely to teach in higher grades, which in the
primary school context are also the tested grades.

RESULTS
Main Results
Table 2 reports estimates of the baseline DD model shown in Equation (4). Column (1)
reports estimates of a simple DD specification that controls for neither teacher characteristics nor

7

The basic value-added model is similar to those estimated in Gershenson (forthcoming) using similar
NCERDC data. See Appendix A for more description of the value-added model and estimation.
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school FE. This coefficient estimate is equivalent to the double difference between average
teacher absences in 2003 and 2004, and between schools that passed AYP in 2003 and schools
that failed AYP in 2003. The resulting estimate of −1.25 is strongly statistically significant and
suggests that on average, failing to make AYP in the initial year of NCLB decreased annual
teacher absences by about 1.25 absences. Columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 2 add teacher covariates,
school FE, and time-varying school covariates to the DD regression model, respectively,
resulting in similarly sized treatment effect estimates. It is reassuring that the DD point estimate
is robust to conditioning on teacher characteristics and time-varying school characteristics, as
this suggests that the estimates are not biased by underlying trends in the composition of schools’
faculty or enrollments. The specification reported in column (4) of Table 2 that conditions on
school FE and teacher and school covariates is the preferred baseline specification.
The remainder of Table 2 investigates the robustness of the baseline results to the
functional form through which teacher absences enter the model. Because teacher absences are
strictly nonnegative and zeros are exceedingly rare in the data, column (5) of Table 2 estimates
the baseline specification using the natural log of total teacher absences as the dependent
variable. 8 The DD estimate remains negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent
confidence level. Specifically, the point estimate of −0.09 suggests that failing AYP is associated
with approximately a 9 percent decrease in teacher absences.
Finally, following Jacob (2013), columns 6–9 of Table 2 report estimates of binary
outcome models in which the dependent variable equals one if the teacher was absent 15 or more
times, and zero otherwise. Column (6) presents OLS estimates of a linear probability model

8

Zeros are rare because many teachers have 0.5 annual absences, perhaps because of how an in-service
professional development program was coded. In the log specification zeros were replaced with 0.5, the smallest
nonzero value observed in the data.
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(LPM) that is otherwise equivalent to the preferred baseline specification. The LPM estimate
suggests that, on average, failing AYP decreased the probability of a teacher being absent 15 or
more times by three percentage points, and this effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent
confidence level. From a base of 11 percent, this represents a 27 percent decrease in teachers
who were absent 15 or more times per school year. Importantly, this result suggests that the
pressure associated with failing AYP drastically changed some teachers’ effort levels. Column
(7) reports estimates of the same LPM for the restricted sample of schools that experienced
variation in the “absent 15 or more times” indicator. It is reassuring that these estimates are
nearly identical to those presented in column (6), as the FE logit (Chamberlain 1980) estimates
reported in column (8) of Table 2 make the same sample restriction. The FE-logit coefficient
reported in column (8) is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level,
but its magnitude cannot be directly compared to the LPM coefficients, nor can precise average
partial effects (APE) be computed because values of the FE are unobserved. However, scaled
coefficients that are rough approximations of APE, which can be compared to the LPM
coefficients, can be computed using the product of the sample average of Pr(A > 15) (0.11) and
one minus this probability (0.89) as an approximate scaling factor. The resulting scale factor of
0.098 implies an APE of about −0.034, which is in line with the LPM estimates reported above.
Overall, the results presented in Table 2 provide consistent evidence that failing AYP in
2003 caused a significant decline in teacher absences (increase in effort) in 2004, regardless of
how teacher absences are measured. Moreover, the DD estimates are robust to conditioning on
observable teacher characteristics, school FE, and time-varying observable school characteristics,
which suggests that the results are not driven by secular trends in the composition of schools’
enrollments or teaching staffs. Nonetheless, the next section presents a series of sensitivity
16

analyses and falsification tests that further probe the robustness of the results. To place the
baseline estimates presented in Table 2 in context, it is useful to compare them to the estimates
of other interventions’ effects on teacher absences. One relevant comparison is Jacob (2013),
who estimates the effect of a change in policy in Chicago Public Schools during the early 2000s
that decreased the job security of probationary teachers by increasing principals’ ability to
dismiss such teachers. Using a DD strategy similar to that employed in the current paper, Jacob
finds that the policy change decreased teacher absences by about 1 absence per year and
decreased the probability that a teacher had 15 or more annual absences by about four percentage
points. These point estimates are remarkably similar to those reported in Table 2, as are the
estimated effects when converted to percentages. Similarly, Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2009)
find that directly charging teachers $50 per absence would reduce average annual absence rates
by about one full absence. Finally, reducing the number of teachers who are absent more than 15
times per school year has arguably practically significant effects on student achievement: 10
teacher absences reduce math achievement by about 0.02 math score SD, which is equivalent to
replacing an average teacher with one from the bottom quintile of the effectiveness distribution
(Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2009; Herrmann and Rockoff 2013).
Sensitivity Analyses
Table 3 reports a variety of robustness checks and sensitivity analyses designed to test the
baseline DD estimate’s robustness to a variety of modeling choices, assumptions, and estimation
strategies. Columns (1) and (2) estimate augmented versions of the preferred baseline
specification that control for unobserved teacher heterogeneity by conditioning on lagged
absences and teacher FE, respectively. The lagged-absences DD estimate in column (1) is
slightly smaller than the preferred baseline estimate, though it remains larger than one in
17

magnitude and is significant at the 5 percent confidence level. 9 The two-way school and teacher
FE DD point estimate reported in column (2) is nearly identical to the lagged-absences estimate
shown in column (1), though imprecisely estimated. 10 The imprecision of the two-way FE
estimate is unsurprising, as the identifying variation in this model comes from the small number
of teachers who changed schools between the 2003 and 2004 school years. Nonetheless, the
similarity between the lagged-absences and two-way FE estimates is reassuring, given the
bracketing property of these two estimators (Angrist and Pischke 2009, p. 245). Together, the
similarities between the baseline estimate of −1.37 and the estimated effects in columns (1) and
(2) of Table 3 suggest that the baseline DD estimate is not biased by endogenous sorting of
teachers into schools. Moreover, the teacher-FE estimate in column (3) suggests that the results
are driven by changes in teacher behavior, as opposed to changes in the composition of “treated”
schools’ teaching staffs. The estimates in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 further investigate this
issue.
To provide further evidence that the accountability pressure associated with failing AYP
caused a change in teacher behavior, as opposed to merely changing the composition of the
teaching force in such schools, column (3) of Table 3 estimates the baseline model on a restricted
sample that excludes teachers who changed schools between 2003 and 2004. The resulting
estimate is nearly identical to the preferred baseline estimate, again indicating that the threat of
sanctions caused individual teachers to increase effort. Column (4) estimates a version of the
preferred baseline model that replaces the school FE with teacher FE, using the same restricted
sample. School FEs are redundant in this specification, as the sample is restricted to teachers
9

The sample size in the lagged specification is smaller than in the baseline because data on 2002 absences
are missing for many teachers.
10
The two-way FE specification is estimated using the estimator proposed by Mittag (2012).
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who did not change schools. Once again, the point estimate decreases slightly but remains larger
than one in magnitude and is significant at the 5 percent confidence level. The estimates reported
in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 are consistent with the lagged-absence and two-way FE
estimates reported in columns (1) and (2) and provide additional evidence that the baseline DD
estimate is capturing the behavioral response of individual teachers and not changes in schools’
faculties.
Another potential concern is that the baseline estimates are influenced by the behavior of
outliers who are absent at extremely high rates, as high rates of absence are more likely to be
associated with health issues than shirking (Jacob 2013). Accordingly, column (5) of Table 3
reports estimates of the preferred baseline model on a restricted sample that excludes teachers
who were absent 50 or more times in a given year. 11 The resulting point estimate falls slightly, to
about negative one, but remains strongly statistically significant and is actually more precisely
estimated than the preferred baseline estimate. Again, this result is consistent with the notion that
the threat of NCLB sanctions caused a behavioral response in teachers’ effort provisions.
Finally, the remaining columns of Table 3 test the parallel slopes assumption, which is
the crucial identifying assumption required for consistency of the DD estimator. Specifically, the
DD estimates require that schools that failed AYP in 2003 were not already experiencing
different trends in teacher absences than were schools that made AYP in 2003. Columns (6) and
(7) do so indirectly in the spirit of regression discontinuity (RD) designs that exploit schools’
“closeness” to the 2003 AYP margin (e.g., Ahn and Vigdor 2014; Chakrabarti 2014). Following
Ahn and Vigdor, I create a school-specific running variable (c) that equals the minimum of the
differences between the actual 2003 proficiency rates and the 2003 thresholds for each relevant
11

Qualitatively similar results are obtained using lower cutoffs (e.g., < 40 absences).
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subgroup and the school as a whole. 12 According to the rule, when c is ≥ 0, the school should
make AYP and fail to do so otherwise. I use the variable c in two ways. First, in the spirit of the
“discontinuity sample” sensitivity analysis advocated by Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 257), I
use c to restrict the baseline sample to schools that were “close” to the AYP margin. Column (6)
of Table 3 reports estimates of the baseline DD specification using a sample restricted to schools
in the 10th–90th interpercentile range of c. 13 The resulting DD estimate is slightly smaller than
the preferred baseline estimate but remains larger than one in magnitude and statistically
significant at the 5 percent confidence level, suggesting that the main results are not driven by
extremely high- or low-performing schools. Second, I use c to directly estimate a “simple”
fuzzy-RD by 2SLS (Angrist and Pischke 2009, p. 261) using 2004 data. The RD estimate is
reported in column (7) and is similar in magnitude to both the baseline and “discontinuity
sample” DD estimates, though it is imprecisely estimated. 14 Together, these RD-flavored
sensitivity analyses suggest that the main results are not driven by schools in the tails of the
“AYP likelihood” distribution, and highlight the importance of conditioning on school FE in the
baseline DD specification.
Columns (8) and (9) conclude the series of robustness checks by directly addressing the
parallel slopes assumption. Both analyses utilize data dating back to 1997, which is the omitted
reference year. Column (8) estimates an augmented version of the preferred baseline model that
conditions on school-specific quadratic time trends. The point estimate remains larger than one
in magnitude and statistically significant at 5 percent confidence, which suggests that the

12

See Appendix B for a precise description of how c is computed and RD estimation.
Qualitatively similar results are obtained using smaller inter-percentile ranges (e.g., 25th–75th).
14
Alternative RD specifications and bandwidths yield similarly imprecise, negative point estimates of
similar magnitude. The simple RD estimate reported here is preferred because of its relative transparency and good
finite sample properties (Angrist and Psichke 2009, p. 261).
13
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baseline estimates are not the result of preexisting differential trends in treated schools. Rather,
teachers in schools that failed AYP in 2003 experienced, on average, a negative 1.65 absence
deviation from trend in the second year of NCLB. 15 Similarly, column (9) reports estimates of an
event-study specification that interacts a series of year indicators with the “failed AYP in 2003”
indicator, which allows for a direct test for the presence of preexisting differential trends in
teacher absences in the schools that ultimately failed AYP in 2003. It is extremely reassuring,
particularly given the imprecision of the RD estimate, that the pre-2004 placebo effects
(interaction terms) are neither individually nor jointly statistically significant. Moreover, the
placebo effects are uniformly small in magnitude (< 0.30) and display no clear patterns or trends,
as half are positive, half are negative, and the magnitudes oscillate from year to year. In sum, the
robustness checks and sensitivity analyses reported in Table 3 provide consistent evidence of a
statistically significant, negative, arguably causal effect of the threat of sanctions associated with
failing AYP in the first year of NCLB on teacher effort in the subsequent year, of slightly more
than one absence per year. In particular, the last two columns of Table 3 provide strong evidence
that the “parallel slopes” identifying assumption of the DD estimator is not violated, and hence
that the DD estimates can be given a causal interpretation. The following section investigates
whether these effects vary by observed teacher qualifications, teaching in a high-stakes (tested)
grade, or teaching effectiveness.
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
There are a number of reasons why the increased accountability pressure associated with
failing AYP in the first year of NCLB might elicit varied responses from different types of

15

A linear school trend specification yields a point estimate of the treatment effect that is nearly identical
to the baseline DD estimate (1.37) and strongly statistically significant.
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teachers. For example, teachers in high-stakes (i.e., tested) grades may feel greater pressure to
increase student achievement on the end-of-grade tests used to compute proficiency rates (Fuller
and Ladd 2013). In the analytic sample, grades 3–5 are tested and grades K–2 are not. The effect
might also vary by observable teacher characteristics such as educational attainment, National
Board Certification (NBC), experience, selectivity of undergraduate institution, and gender.
Rationale for why the effect might vary by these characteristics is as follows. The first three
characteristics all affect teacher pay scales in North Carolina. Because the cost of using sick days
is loosely tied to earnings, and more strongly to experience, it is plausible that responses to
increased accountability pressure vary by these characteristics. More generally, the training and
experiences associated with these characteristics, and with attending a selective undergraduate
institution, might make some teachers more resilient to changes in the work environment. Lastly,
regarding gender, it is hypothesized that women are more sensitive to changes in accountability
pressure. For example, previous research shows that changes in public-sector sick leave and
monitoring policies have larger effects on women than on men (De Paola, Scoppa, and Pupo
2014), which could be attributable to either differences in home responsibilities or psychological
differences (Bertrand 2011).
Column (1) of Table 4 reports estimates of an augmented version of the baseline model
that fully interacts the year, failed AYP, and year × failed AYP terms with these observable
teacher characteristics. 16 Because teacher characteristics vary within school years, it is now
possible to replace the school FE with school-by-year FE. These estimates are reported in
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Models that include one source of heterogeneity at a time yield qualitatively similar results. Experience
and the corresponding interaction terms are modeled linearly, as the nonparametric estimates reported in Wiswall
(2013) suggest that the returns to experience are approximately linear. However, the finding of no differential effects
by experience is robust to modeling the interaction effect as a quadratic or cubic function in experience, and to
instead using a “new teacher” binary indicator.
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column (2) of Table 4. The school FE and school-by-year FE estimates are similar to one
another, which is reassuring and again suggests that the main results are not driven by schoolspecific trends. Only the selective undergraduate institution interaction terms are even marginally
statistically significant, and as a whole the interaction terms are jointly insignificant. Still, while
insignificant at traditional confidence levels, the tested-grade interaction effect of about one is
interesting, as it suggests that the decrease in teacher absences documented to this point is
stronger among teachers in low-stakes, nontested grades. One possible explanation of this
suggestive result is that the increased stress associated with teaching in a high-stress environment
(e.g., Barksdale-Ladd and Thomas 2000; Daly and Chrispeels 2005; Fuller and Ladd 2013),
which is associated with employee absences in other settings (Ose, 2005), is particularly acute in
tested grades.
The selective undergraduate institution interaction effect is relatively large in magnitude
and significant at the 10 percent confidence level, suggesting that teachers who attended
selective undergraduate institutions experienced even larger decreases in absences (increases in
effort) in response to failing AYP in 2003. Taken at face value, the average decrease of more
than five annual absences represents a more than 50 percent decline in absences among such
teachers. We can only speculate as to the reason for this apparent difference, which could be
attributable to the higher levels of cognitive and noncognitive skills associated with selection
into, and accumulated at, selective undergraduate institutions. Regardless of the underlying
cause, this result had potential implications for education policy and student achievement, as the
selectivity of teachers’ undergraduate institutions is weakly positively associated with student
achievement gains (Boyd et al. 2008; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2007; Rockoff et al. 2011).
Finally, the statistically insignificant but positive male interaction effect suggests that women
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were marginally more affected by the threat of sanctions than men, which is consistent with De
Paola, Scoppa, and Pupo (2014).
Still, what might be of most interest to education policymakers is how teachers’ effort
levels respond to the threat of sanctions across the distribution of teacher effectiveness. It is well
documented that the observable teacher qualifications discussed above explain, at best, only a
small percentage of the total variation across classrooms in student achievement gains (e.g.,
Rockoff, Kane, and Staiger 2011). Accordingly, as described in the Data section and Appendix
A, I directly estimate teachers’ math VAMs using matched student-teacher data. I then create a
set of categorical indicators that identify which quartile of the VAM distribution each teacher
falls in and once again estimate augmented versions of the baseline model that fully interact the
year, failed AYP, and year × failed AYP terms with these categorical indicators of teacher
effectiveness. Of course, VAMs are only available for teachers who taught in a tested grade in at
least two years, so the VAM interaction specification can only be estimated on a subset of the
baseline analytic sample.
Columns (3)–(5) of Table 4 report three sets of estimates that rely on the subsample of
teachers for whom VAM scores could be computed. Column (3) reports estimates of the
preferred baseline model, which contains no interaction terms, to provide context. The DD point
estimate is negative, slightly smaller than the preferred baseline estimate, and imprecisely
estimated. It is unsurprising that the point estimate is smaller, as tested-grade teachers comprise
the majority of the subsample, and the interaction specifications reported in columns (1) and (2)
of Table 4 suggest that the effect was smaller among tested-grade teachers. Similarly, the
estimate’s imprecision may owe to the substantially reduced sample size. Columns (4) and (5) of
Table 4 report estimates of the VAM-interaction models that condition on school and school-by24

year FE, respectively. As in the teacher-qualification interaction models, the two VAM
interaction models yield qualitatively similar results, though the interaction effects in the schoolby-year FE specification are almost twice as large. Interestingly, the VAM interactions suggest
that more effective teachers responded more strongly to the threat of sanctions than teachers in
the bottom quartile of the effectiveness distribution. Specifically, these results suggest that more
effective teachers decreased their absences by about 3–6 absences more than their less-effective
counterparts, which represents an arguably practically significant increase in effort. This is
consistent with the finding of larger decreases in absences among teachers who attended
selective undergraduate institutions and suggests that it is the more effective teachers who are
either able or willing to increase effort in response to the pressures associated with consequential
accountability policies.
Conclusions
This paper estimates the effect of the threat of sanctions tied to failing to meet
performance standards on employee effort in the public sector. The analysis exploits the fact that
in the second year of NCLB, schools that failed to make AYP in the first year were at risk of
facing the sanctions associated with failing to make AYP in two consecutive years. The results
suggest that in year two of NCLB, teachers in schools that failed to make AYP in year one
significantly reduced their annual absences by about 10 percent, or a little more than one absence
per year. Similarly, the probability that a teacher was absent 15 or more times fell by 27 percent,
or three percentage points, in such schools. The effect of NCLB’s performance standards on
teacher effort was concentrated among more effective teachers, and the effect was mostly due to
within-teacher changes in effort, as opposed to compositional changes in schools’ teaching staffs.
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These effects are arguably practically significant, as research on the harm associated with
teacher absences in North Carolina finds that a one SD increase in teacher absences is associated
with a decrease in math achievement of about 0.02 test-score SD, or 20 percent of the effect of a
one-SD increase in teacher effectiveness (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2009; Herrmann and
Rockoff 2012). The estimated effects of performance standards on teacher effort are consistent
with previous research on the malleability of teacher effort, as Ahn (2013) and Jacob (2013) find
evidence that teacher effort, as measured by teacher absences, responds to incentives. Indeed, the
magnitudes of the estimated effects in the current paper are similar to those of the estimated
effects of a policy change in Chicago that granted principals the discretion to dismiss
probationary teachers (Jacob 2013). Finally, it is worth noting that the estimates reported here
likely underestimate the total effect of NCLB on teacher absences and teacher effort, as the
policy placed pressure on all schools, including those that made AYP in the first year (Fuller and
Ladd 2013). Moreover, absences admittedly only measure one dimension of teacher effort.
The results of the current study have at least three implications for education policy. First,
that teacher absences fell in response to increased accountability pressure suggests that one
mechanism through which consequential accountability policies affect student achievement is
through increased teacher effort. Second, these results contribute to the growing body of
evidence that teacher effort, as measured by absences, responds to both school- and individuallevel incentives. Finally, the heterogeneity in teachers’ responses to the threatened sanctions
associated with failing AYP in the first year of NCLB suggest potential benefits to policy
designs and teacher training programs that account for such differences. For example, to the
extent that teachers in tested and nontested grades responded differently to the threat of
sanctions, standard labor-economic theory suggests that if jobs in tested grades are more
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stressful, such jobs can pay compensating differentials. The wage differentials need not be
monetary and could instead be provided in the form of additional planning periods, teaching aids,
or professional development. Similarly, that the increase in effort was particularly strong among
more effective teachers suggests that providing additional support to less effective teachers may
be helpful, particularly for teachers and schools subject to increased accountability pressure.
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Appendix A
Value Added Measures (VAMs) of Teacher Effectiveness

Following Gershenson (forthcoming) and Jackson (2013), VAMs of teacher effectiveness
are generated by value-added models of the form
(A.1)

yijgst
= α yi,t −1 + βxit + γc−i, jgst + θ j + π g + ωst + uijgst ,

where i, j, g, s, and t index students, teachers, grades, schools, and years, respectively; y is
performance on the end-of-grade math test, which is standardized by grade and year to have
mean zero and standard deviation one (Ballou 2009); x is a vector of observed student
characteristics including race, gender, poverty status, special education, and English language
proficiency; c is a vector of classroom characteristics including class size, class composition, and
the average of student i’s classmates’ lagged achievement (peer effects); θ, π, and ω are teacher,
grade, and school-by-year fixed effects (FE), respectively; and u is an idiosyncratic error term.
Equation (A.1) is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) for two reasons. First,
Guarino, Reckase, and Wooldridge (forthcoming) find OLS to be the most robust estimator to a
variety of potential student-teacher assignment scenarios. This is potentially important, as
Rothstein (2010) finds evidence of nonrandom sorting in North Carolina. Second, Chetty,
Friedman, and Rockoff (2014) find that most sorting of students to teachers is based on lagged
test scores and that conditioning on lagged test scores alone yields estimated teacher effects with
near-zero bias. Similarly, Kane and Staiger (2008) find that controlling for lagged test scores
yields unbiased estimates of teacher effects and that controlling for classroom characteristics
(i.e., the vector c) improves the precision of estimated teacher effects.
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Equation (A.1) is estimated using student-level data on more than 1,112,000 fourth and
fifth grade students and more than 32,000 fourth and fifth grade teachers between the years 2004
and 2010, as third-grade and 2003 data are lost in the creation of lag scores. Note that a VAM
can be estimated for a teacher who did not teach in a tested grade in 2004, so long as the teacher
did teach in a tested grade in at least two years during this time span. The estimated teacher
effects are strongly jointly significant (F = 4.5), and the standard deviation of estimated teacher
effects is 0.48. Estimated teacher effects range from −3.38 to 2.13. Quartiles of the full
distribution of estimated teacher effects are −0.28, 0.06, and 0.29.
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Appendix B
Regression Discontinuity (RD) Sensitivity Analysis

The RD sensitivity analyses reported in columns (7) and (8) of Table 3 rely on a schoolspecific running variable (c) that measures the school’s closeness to making AYP in 2003. In
2003, there were no waivers or “safe harbor” exemptions. In North Carolina, schools must make
AYP both overall and in student subgroups that contain 40 or more students. Subgroups are
Asian/Pacific Islander, black, Hispanic, multiracial, Native American, white, economically
disadvantaged, limited English proficient, and students with disability. If any subgroup’s
proficiency rate does not meet the threshold defined by the state, the school fails to make AYP.
North Carolina’s primary school math and reading proficiency thresholds in 2003 were 74.6
percent and 68.9 percent, respectively. Thus, following Ahn and Vigdor (2014), I define c as the
minimum within-school difference between the actual proficiency rate of each subgroup and the
state’s AYP threshold. Proficiency rates are taken from data compiled by Reback, Rockoff, and
Schwartz (2014), which the authors graciously make publicly available here:
http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/nclb/.
After creating c, I estimate a “simple” fuzzy-RD design by 2SLS (Angrist and Pischke
2009, p. 261) using all 2004 data on teacher absences. Specifically, the first stage is
(B.1)

Failedis =π 0 + π 1cs + π 2 X is + π 3Ts + ξis ,

where T is a binary indicator equal to one if c < 0, and zero otherwise. The first-stage results
provide no evidence of a weak instruments problem. The second stage is then
(B.2)

Ais =β 0 + β1cs + β 2 X is + τ Failed 03s + ε is .
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I report this “simple” fuzzy-RD estimate in Table 3 because it is relatively transparent and has
good finite sample properties (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p. 261). However, a variety of
alternative specifications were considered, including polynomials in c, allowing the slope to vary
for positive and negative values of c, excluding X from the model, conditioning on school-district
FE, and trimming schools with high and low values of c from the analytic sample. These
alternative specifications generally yield estimates of τ in the range of −0.5 to −2.5, none of
which are statistically significant at traditional confidence levels, regardless of whether the
standard errors are clustered at the school level or not clustered at all.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics for Baseline Analytic Sample

Absences

Full sample

VAM sample

(1)

(2)

8.7

8.3

SD

[9.6]

[8.8]

Within-school SD

[9.3]

[8.2]

Within-school-year SD

[9.1]

[7.7]

Within-teacher SD

[5.1]

[4.9]

15 or more absences

0.11

0.10

2004

0.54

0.56

Failed AYP in 2003

0.46

0.48

Tested grade

0.52

0.92

Master’s

0.27

0.28

Doctorate

0.01

0.01

Selective

0.05

0.04

National Board Certified

0.10

0.12

Experience

14.1

13.9

[10.0]

[9.8]

Male

0.04

0.07

White

0.81

0.81

Black

0.14

0.14

SD

Quartile 1 VAM
Quartile 2 VAM

0.22

Quartile 3 VAM

0.26

Quartile 4 VAM

0.27

N (teacher years)
Schools

0.26

8,080

2,558

331

293

NOTE: Teacher years are the unit of analysis. Standard deviations (SD) are
reported in brackets for noncategorical variables. The analytic samples are
restricted to teachers in Title 1 schools for whom the relevant teacher- and schoollevel data are available. VAM = math value-added measure.
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Table 2 Main Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Effect of Failing AYP on Teacher Absences
Dependent variable
Level of absences (A)
Log(A)
OLS
OLS
OLS
OLS
OLS
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Failed AYP 2003
0.25
0.24
(0.37)
(0.36)
2003
Omitted
2004
0.21
0.17
0.39
0.51
0.07
(0.33)
(0.32)
(0.34)
(0.37)
(0.03)**
2004×Failed
−1.25
−1.24
−1.30
−1.37
−0.09
(0.43)***
(0.43)***
(0.44)***
(0.45)***
(0.04)**
Adjusted R2
0.002
0.01
0.005
0.004
0.01
Pseudo R2
N (teacher years)
8,080
8,080
8,080
8,080
8,080
Schools
331
331
331
331
331
Teacher X
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
School FE
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
School X
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

LPM
(6)

1{A > 15}
LPM
(7)

0.01
(0.01)
−0.03
(0.01)**
0.004

0.01
(0.01)
−0.03
(0.02)**
0.004

8,080
331
Yes
Yes
Yes

7,513
263
Yes
Yes
Yes

Logit
(8)

0.10
(0.12)
−0.35
(0.15)**
0.01
7,513
263
Yes
Yes
Yes

NOTE: Standard errors are clustered by school. Teacher X includes a quadratic in experience and categorical indicators of race, gender, educational attainment, National Board
Certification, selectivity of undergraduate institution, and grade taught. School X includes quadratics in school size and the number of full time equivalent teachers, the studentteacher ratio, and the percent of the student body that is Hispanic, black, and eligible for free or reduced price lunch. All samples are restricted to data from the 2003 and 2004
school years. Logit models are estimated using the Chamberlain (1980) conditional (FE) logit estimator, which drops units for which there is no variation in the dependent
variable, and logit coefficients are reported. 1{.} is the indicator function. OLS = ordinary least squares. LPM = linear probability model. ***p 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 3 Robustness Checks of Effect of Failing AYP on Teacher Absences
Two-way
Balanced
Balanced
Lagged
Specification
teacherpanel +
panel
absences
school FE
teacher FE
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1998×Failed

< 50 abs.
sample
restriction
(5)

Discontinuity
sample
restriction
(6)

−0.98
(0.34)***

−1.09
(0.45)**

RD
estimate
(2SLS)
(7)

Quadratic
school
time trends
(8)

−1.65
(0.65)**

(9)
0.23
(0.38)
−0.28
(0.42)
−0.08
(0.46)
−0.11
(0.43)
0.15
(0.44)
0.29
(0.46)
−1.07
(0.48)**

0.03
28,456
367
Yes
Yes
No

0.01
28,456
367
Yes
Yes
No

1999×Failed
2000×Failed
2001×Failed
2002×Failed
2003×Failed
2004×Failed

−1.10
(0.53)**

−1.09
(0.86)

−1.40
(0.47)***

−1.06
(0.47)**

Failed
Adjusted R2
N
Schools
Controls
School FE
Teacher FE

0.02
6,149
313
Yes
Yes
No

0.15
8,080
331
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.004
7,898
331
Yes
Yes
No

0.01
7,898
331
Yes
No
Yes

0.004
7,991
331
Yes
Yes
No

0.002
6,396
251
Yes
Yes
No

−1.09
(0.97)
0.01
4,187
294
Yes
No
No

Event study

NOTE: Standard errors are clustered by school. Control variables include a quadratic in experience and categorical indicators of race, gender, educational attainment, National
Board Certification, selectivity of undergraduate institution, grade taught, quadratics in school size and the number of full time equivalent teachers, the student-teacher ratio, and
the percent of the student body that is Hispanic, black, and eligible for free or reduced price lunch. The samples in columns (1)–(6) are restricted to data from the 2003 and 2004
school years. The sample in column (7) uses only 2004 data while the sample in columns (8) and (9) uses data from 1997–2004 and includes a full set of year FE. The balanced
panels in columns (4) and (5) exclude teachers who changed schools between 2003 and 2004. RD = regression discontinuity. The “discontinuity” sample in column (6) is
restricted to schools whose distance to the AYP cutoff was between the 10th and 90th percentiles of the distribution. Column (7) applies a “simple” fuzzy RD 2SLS estimator
(Angrist and Pischke 2009, p. 261). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 4 Heterogeneity in Effects of Failing AYP on Teacher Absences
Baseline sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
2004
1.19
0.34
(0.70)*
(0.62)
2004×Failed
−1.71
−0.82
(0.93)*
(0.72)
2004× Failed×Tested
1.12
1.62
(0.91)
(1.06)
2004×Failed×Masters
0.14
0.24
(1.00)
(1.05)
2004×Failed×Doctorate
1.36
3.84
(8.84)
(7.82)
2004×Failed×Selective
−3.92
−4.13
(2.16)*
(2.17)*
2004×Failed×NBC
−0.27
−0.05
(1.20)
(1.33)
2004×Failed×Experience
−0.01
−0.02
(0.04)
(0.05)
2004×Failed×Male
1.28
1.34
(1.27)
(1.42)
2004×Failed×VAM Q2
2004×Failed×VAM Q3
2004×Failed×VAM Q4
School FE
School-by-year FE
Adjusted R2
N (teacher years)
Schools

Yes
No
0.004
8,080
331

No
Yes
0.004
8,080
331

Yes
No
0.01
2,558
293

VAM sample
(4)
−0.81
(1.10)
1.32
(1.53)

−2.05
(2.01)
−3.64
(2.07)*
−2.73
(1.95)
Yes
No
0.01
2,558
293

(5)

−4.10
(2.91)
−6.69
(3.31)**
−5.74
(3.64)
No
Yes
0.01
2,558
293

NOTE: Standard errors are clustered by school. All models condition on X and the appropriate subinteractions (e.g., 2004×X,
Failed×X). The models are estimated using data from the 2003 and 2004 school years. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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